Interconnector between Iceland and GB, cost benefit analysis and impact assessment

Presentation for UK-ICE Energy Task Force

London, February 8th 2016
1. Introduction and background
2. Methodology
3. Interconnector business models
4. Market scenarios
5. Key market projection results
6. Cost-benefit analysis
7. Iceland impact analysis

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1. Introduction and background

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London, February 8th 2016
**Kvika and Pöyry**

**Kvika:**
- The only privately held specialised investment bank in Iceland
- Provides all core services; capital markets, corporate finance, asset management and specialised banking
- Focus on Asset Management and Infrastructure investment advisory
- Market leader in Nasdaq OMX Iceland 2015

**Pöyry:**
- Europe’s leading specialist energy management consultancy
- Offering expert advice from strategy to implementation on policy, regulation, business operations, financing and valuation and sustainability
- Providing in-depth market analysis and strategic insight across Europe
- Over 250 energy market experts in 12 offices across Europe
The project team

Kvika:

**Steering committee:**
- Dr. Sigurður Hannesson, Managing Director Kvika Asset Management. D. Phil in mathematics from University of Oxford
- Sigurður Atli Jónsson, CEO of Kvika
- Magnús Bjarnason, MD International Banking Kvika. Background in renewable energy, investment banking and governmental services

**Project Manager:**
- Rósant Torfason, Corporate finance Kvika. rosant@kvika.is

Pöyry:

**Steering committee:**
- Dr. Gareth Davies, director at Pöyry. Over 17 years of experience in energy policy analysis and energy market economics. PhD in Economics.
- Michael Martin, principal consultant at Pöyry. Has a vast experience in the modelling of both hydro and thermal markets.

**Project Manager:**
- Micheal Martin. michel.martin@poyry.com
Scope of the work

Cost benefit analysis and impact assessment for Iceland

- **Cost Benefit Analysis for Iceland:**
  - Projection on wholesale prices in Iceland with and without an Interconnector
  - Producer and consumer surplus in Iceland
  - Cost of the Interconnector, losses and cable failures
  - Business Models / Evaluate optimal Business Model for Iceland
  - Support mechanism; CfD’s, Capacity Mechanism, other guarantees.
  - Demand and supply projection

- **Impact assessment on Iceland:**
  - Households
  - Power Intensive industries, other industries and services
  - Energy sector and transmission system
  - Security of supply

- **Other items:**
  - Analyze potential options to mitigate higher electricity prices in Iceland
  - Experience from other countries i.e. Norway
  - Environmental issues
Driven by power-intensive industries (PII)

80% of current demand from PII

Three aluminium smelters, 75% of demand

Long term Power purchase agreements (PPA)

Households use, 5% of total consumption
Overview of the Icelandic electricity market

Electricity generation in Iceland divided by source

- 71% from hydropower or 12.9 TWh
- 29% from geothermal or 5.3 TWh
- Only 8 GWh from 4 onshore windmills
- Landsvirkjun is the far largest producer with 71% share
- Two other producers with total 26% share
Icelink project introduction

Key figures

- Shortest distance between the countries less than 900 kM
- Example on graph approximately 1,200 kM
- Capacity of 1,000 MW
- Calculated availability 92%
If landing is on the east coast the circular transmission system needs to be upgraded from 220kV lines to 400 kV lines.

If landing is on the south coast less investment is needed.

Need for investment in the onshore transmission will also depend on the exact location of the new generation.
The cost was compared to other projects

Discussions with project developers

Overall cost EUR 3-3.5 bn

Cost of onshore transmission built up based on information from Landsnet
Iceland market key assumptions

The Master plan for Nature conservation and utilisation of energy

- 9.2 TWh in the Utilisation category or 14%
- Protected and developed options 44.1 TWh or 69%
- On hold category 17% or 11.3 TWh
- Onshore wind and small hydro were outside the scope of the second phase of the Master Plan
Projects in the Utilisation category of the Master plan ≈ 9 TWh

Onshore wind ≈ 6 TWh
Small hydro ≈ 1 TWh
Low temperature geothermal

Assumptions based on information from DECC, IRENA and Landsvirkjun

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<th>Lifetime (years)</th>
<th>OPEX (real)</th>
<th>WACC (real)</th>
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<tr>
<td>Hydro</td>
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<td>1.5%</td>
<td>7.9%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Onshore wind</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>4.0%</td>
<td>7.9%</td>
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</table>
Three demand scenarios in Iceland

- Low with no further build up of PII after 2018
- High with same PII build up rate from 2018-2035, as was in the period 2009-2018
- Central with moderate PII build up rate

Variable demand projection in line with population and tourist
2. Methodology

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PRINCIPLES OF THE ANALYSIS

Pöyry has used a fundamental model and socio-economic analysis

- The economic value of the interconnector has been assessed through a CBA approach in line with ENTSO-E guidelines looking at socio-economic welfare.

- A fundamental hydro-thermal power market model has been used to simulate supply and demand in GB and Iceland.

- A proxy has been used for wholesale prices in Iceland, to simulate economic flows.

- Several fundamental scenarios and business models for Icelink have been tested.
THE COST BENEFIT ANALYSIS

The CBA focuses on consumer/producer surplus and congestion rent

- The cost benefit analysis looks at the consumer and producer surplus, as well as congestion rent.

- Transfers from consumers to producers (or vice-versa) are not the primary concern of this type of analysis.

- The aim of this analysis is not to look at contractual structures (who owns what) but to capture sources of costs and benefits.

- Conventions, methodology and assumptions are in line with ENTSO-E guidelines.

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**BID3 – PÖYRY’S ELECTRICITY MARKET MODEL**

BID3 projects physical operation (generator output, electricity flows, emissions) and economic behaviour (electricity prices, revenues)

### Basics of BID3
- BID3 is an optimisation which minimises the system cost in a year subject to constraints
- Pöyry has included in BID3 the following thermal plant dynamics
  - Start-up,
  - Part-loading (no-load), Minimum Stable Generation
  - Minimum off times, minimum on time
  - Start-up cost and variable maintenance costs dependent on start temperature
  - Ramping
  - Reserve/response

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Inputs and outputs of BID3</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Inputs</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Power station data (efficiency, capacity, fuel, MSG, …)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Demand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fuels, commodity prices</td>
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<tr>
<td>Interconnectors</td>
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<tr>
<td>Profile data (hourly within-year shape)</td>
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<table>
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<tr>
<th><strong>Outputs</strong></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Prices</td>
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<tr>
<td>Load factors</td>
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<tr>
<td>Interconnection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plant revenue</td>
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<tr>
<td>Infrastructure constraints</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
THE PRICE OF POWER IN ICELAND

The price of power is not a simple subject when it comes to the Icelandic system

- In a hydro market connected to a thermal market, reservoir bids at the opportunity cost

- Another way of thinking about it: the price is set so that Iceland produces the optimal amount of water from reservoirs
  - i.e. so that the right amount is exported through Icelink

- This ‘spot’ short term price does not currently exist in Iceland, and may not materialise even with Icelink
  - But that is still the fundamental value of an incremental MWh of electricity

- Investments are modelled in BID3 to give the right equilibrium price: the wholesale price is equal or higher than the LRMC of new investments. The marginal LRMC is used as a proxy in parts of the analysis.
3. Interconnector Business Models

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CASH FLOW ROUTES FOR ICELINK

The benefits and viability of Icelink are heavily dependent on the project set-up

- Icelink is not a ‘standard’ interconnector in the European context
  - No ‘spot price’ in Iceland, no Short Run Marginal Cost
  - Icelink is in principle based on building renewable generation to export to GB

- Two revenue streams on the GB side have been analysed
  - The wholesale price (in the case of merchant interconnector, with or without cap & floor) and capacity payment
  - Wholesale price + Contract for Difference (CfD) remunerating carbon-free generation in GB

- On the Icelandic side, two ways for an interconnector to pay for electricity have been analysed
  - Through a PPA with a generator
  - A ‘spot price’ – which at the moment doesn’t exist
Depending on the combination of ‘cash flow routes’, we identify 3 business models:

- **‘Full merchant’**
  - Does not refer to ownership structure, but to source of revenues
  - Compatible with cap & floor regulation to stabilise revenues
  - Requires the emergence of a liquid spot price in Iceland
  - Uncoordinated build-out of cable and new generation in Iceland

- **‘Renewable export’**
  - Requires multiple exemptions to the CfD regime, and therefore requires strong political will
  - Most probably the safest investment case
  - Coordinated build out of cable and generation in Iceland

- **‘Integrated merchant’**
  - Merchant model compatible with current structure of Icelandic market
  - May be compatible with cap & floor regulation
  - Coordinated build out of cable and generation in Iceland

### Business models analysed

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Full merchant</th>
<th>Renewable export</th>
<th>Integrated merchant</th>
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<tr>
<td>Comment</td>
<td>'Spot' price</td>
<td>PPA</td>
<td>PPA</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Wholesale price + capacity payment</td>
<td>Wholesale price + CfD</td>
<td>Wholesale price + capacity payment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comment</td>
<td>Compatible with cap &amp; floor</td>
<td>Requires strongest political will</td>
<td>Perhaps compatible with cap &amp; floor</td>
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</table>
THE ICELINK CONCEPT DOCUMENT

The ‘IceLink concept document’ gives a possible commercial design of Icelink

- The Icelink concept gives Landsvirkjun’s and National Grid’s view of a business model and commercial structure compatible with current market designs

- The document highlights the potential ‘exemptions’ to standard terms that would allow this structure to work

- The documents presents qualitative elements of rationale for the interconnector

- The document presents a calculation of a required CfD to ensure project profitability
THE ICELINK CONCEPT DOCUMENT VS. PÖYRY ANALYSIS

- The business case presented in the Concept Document is closest to the ‘RES export’ business case: the source of revenues for interconnector + generation is a Contract for Differences (+ wholesale price)

- The Concept Document assumes a circa 65% export factor, which is one of the sensitivities we have explored

- The basis for this 65% export is to reduce the need for grid reinforcements in GB, and for Icelink to be a source of flexibility as well as a source of imports

- Pöyry’s modelling suggests that there would be little use of this flexibility
  - In the ‘day-ahead’ market
  - In a ‘best guess’ scenario rather than a ‘objectives met’ scenario
  - Results in only 5% higher revenues per MWh than in the Central case

- Pöyry’s analysis does not consider North-South grid reinforcement costs in GB
  - How would a 65% export feed into the reinforcement cost? How would it be operated?

- The required CfD strike price in the concept document is very close to the level found in Pöyry’s analysis
  - Some assumptions are different (duration of CfD, discount rates, etc.)
4. Market scenarios

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**FUNDAMENTAL SCENARIOS**

Pöyry’s standard scenarios capture the fundamental drivers of Icelink

- Fundamental scenarios need to cover the drivers of value for the project: in this case, the wholesale electricity price

- Pöyry has used its own independent energy market projections, based on the detailed fundamental modelling of fuel and power prices

- The Central scenario reflects Pöyry’s assessment of the most likely developments for power prices in GB

- The significant uncertainty in commodity prices leads to an equally significant uncertainty in GB wholesale prices
  - 2025: £36/MWh - £59/MWh - £99/MWh
  - 2035: £42/MWh - £67/MWh - £105/MWh

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**Commodity prices**

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<th>High</th>
<th>Central</th>
<th>Low</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GDP growth (global)</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>3%</td>
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<tr>
<td>ARA coal price ($/tonne)</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>45</td>
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<tr>
<td>Brent oil price ($/bbl)</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>43</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gas price (p/therm)</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carbon price (€/tCO2)</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
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</table>

**Wholesale price in GB**

Source: Pöyry
SIMULATIONS PERFORMED FOR THE ANALYSIS

- Matrix of simulation from 3 fundamental scenarios and 3 business models

- The main fundamental difference is that in the RES export, Icelink replaces offshore wind in GB

- Sensitivities have also been considered:
  - 800MW interconnector
  - Constraining export factor to 65% by reducing generation investment in Iceland

- Some combinations are not compatible
  - In the Low fundamental scenario, there isn’t enough new (uncommitted) offshore wind developed to be displaced by Icelink
  - The 65% export sensitivity is not compatible with a market solution

- Each simulation is performed under 20 weather patterns: difference in inflow between dry and wet years is up to 4TWh
5. **Key market projection results**

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NEW GENERATION INVESTMENTS

New investments are driving exports and prices

- New investments are made based on market principles: until the marginal value of electricity supports new investments

- In the Central scenario, 1450MW of investment is required on top of the 680MW. Overall:
  - 450MW of hydro refurbishments
  - 125MW of new large hydro
  - 150MW of new small hydro
  - 830MW of new geothermal
  - 550MW of onshore wind

- In the High scenario, total investment reaches 3.3GW (including 1.6GW of wind)

Source: Pöyry
SUPPLY AND DEMAND IN ICELAND

A mix still dominated by conventional hydro and geothermal

- Generation in Iceland meets demand and interconnector export
- The share of geothermal electricity increases in all scenarios
- Wind comes after a ‘plateau’ of maximum hydro and geothermal deployment
- Low temperature geothermal and small hydro are not significant contributors to the final mix
Icelink saves around 1.5TWh of spilled inflow per year on average

- Security of supply in Iceland is primarily an energy (TWh) issue

- There needs to be enough hydro generation to meet demand even in dry years

- This leads to a dimensioning of the system where there is a level of spilled hydro energy with normal weather around 2TWh, and up to 4TWh in wet years

- There are other mechanisms, like clauses in PPAs, which impose a potential demand response

- The presence of Icelink reduces spill significantly, down to 0.5TWh per year on average (between 0 and 2.2TWh)
There is little reverse flow from GB to Iceland through Icelink

- The rate of export is close to 85% in the High and Central scenario, and 60-70% in the Low

- In order to have reverse flows, the following conditions need to be fulfilled:
  - Iceland has the ability to store energy: swings of 2GW from full export to full import
  - No prospect of spilling water in the coming weeks
  - Hourly price difference justifies running Iceland like a pumped storage unit
  - The hourly price difference is sustained for more than a few hours (assumed ramping constraints of 400MW/h)

- Market simulations suggest that this set of conditions is not frequently fulfilled

- Other forms of flexibility are likely to emerge in the timeframe of the lifetime of Icelink, making the ‘flexibility’ possibilities from Icelink even less attractive
The presence of Icelink increases electricity prices by around €7/MWh

- On average, the presence of Icelink requires the development of projects with a LRMC €7/MWh higher than if Icelink is not built.

- Some ‘supply curve’ effects bring this number to €12/MWh in the Central scenario in 2025.

- Overall, LRMCs of marginal projects are in the range €33/MWh - €66/MWh, relatively narrow in comparison to the range of GB prices.

- This creates a very large variation of price spreads:
  - €40/MWh-€55/MWh in the Low
  - €52/MWh-€89/MWh in the Central
  - €66/MWh-€141/MWh in the High
The 65% export and the 800MW have (nearly) the same annual export result.

The difference between the two cases is the timing of this export, and the ability to act as a battery: the 65% case has more reverse flows.

The free market would (probably) not deliver a 65% export case: there would be an economic case for more build-out, leading to more exports.

The average export price is slightly higher in the 65% export case:
- 800MW sensitivity: €86.1/MWh
- 65% export sensitivity: €89.7/MWh

Source: Pöyry
6. Cost benefit analysis

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THE COST BENEFIT ANALYSIS

The CBA focuses on consumer/producer surplus and congestion rent

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Socio-economic value of the Icelink project is in general positive, and highest in the RES Export cases

- The total socio-economic value of the Icelink project is the sum of the elements previously described:
  - Socio-economic value in Iceland
  - Socio-economic value in GB
  - Socio-economic value of the cable

- The socio-economic value is highest in the RES Export case, driven by GB side: Icelink reduces consumer costs related to CfD payments

- The socio-economic value is positive in the merchant cases in the Central and the High, and slightly negative in the Low

- The value of saved CO2 emissions in the Merchant cases is not accounted for

- GB transmission reinforcements costs are not included
The net benefit on the Icelandic side is significant

- The producer and consumer surplus effect is the sum of
  - Increase in price creates higher producer surplus and lower consumer surplus
  - Less spill increases producer surplus
  - Higher power generation increases producer surplus
  - Investment and fixed costs in new generation decrease producer surplus

- Net benefit is circa €1.4bn
  - real 2014 money
  - discounted back to 2014 with 4% discount rate

- No change by business model, as prices and volumes in Iceland are not affected

Source: Pöyry
The introduction of Icelink would create significant wealth transfers from consumers to producers

- The introduction of Icelink would increase the marginal value of electricity (the ‘price’)

- Over time, this higher marginal value would be reflected in price paid by consumers
  - Transfer of wealth in the area of €1.9bn (real 2014 money discounted to 2014)

- The exact magnitude timing of the increase in price paid by consumer is uncertain
  - Some consumers covered by long term PPAs
  - Some consumers may have a significant negotiation power
  - The ‘price’ may not emerge in a transparent way

- In any case, transfers of wealth can be mitigated by other policies, and are not considered either as positive or negative in this analysis
Icelink provides renewable electricity at a lower cost than offshore wind in GB

- The strike price is calculated as the level of payment required to ensure a 7.9% IRR for the whole project (generation and transmission)
  - After 15 years, revenues come from wholesale prices and capacity payments

- In the Central scenario, the strike price would be €119/MWh (£96/MWh) for a duration of 15 years
  - Level would drop to €106/MWh (£86/MWh) with a 35 year contract

- The level would increase to €137/MWh (£111/MWh) under the 65% export sensitivity

Source: Pöyry
The benefit is highest in RES export cases

- The net position corresponds to:
  - Change in consumer surplus due to price
  - Change in producer surplus due to price and generation
  - Avoided cost for consumers in paying for a cheaper CfD (to Icelink rather than offshore wind)
  - Avoided costs in thermal investments (due to capacity market)

- Merchant cases do not save any CfD payment, hence the lower net benefit

- Merchant cases have a net CO2 benefit which the RES export cases do not have

- This excludes the cost of reinforcing the Scotland-England transmission network
**SOCIO-ECONOMIC VALUE OF THE CABLE (ISOLATED)**

Costs outweigh the socio-economic benefit for the interconnector alone

- Excluding the welfare benefits in GB and Iceland, the cable itself is not socio-economically beneficial

- Costs (capex&opex) are lower than the congestion rent in the Central and Low scenarios

- In the High scenario, costs (capex&opex) are higher than the congestion rent

- The congestion rent is different from the revenues in the RES export and integrated merchant cases
The socio-economic value is highest in the RES Export cases

- The total socio-economic value of the Icelink project is the sum of the elements previously described:
  - Socio-economic value in Iceland
  - Socio-economic value in GB
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- The socio-economic value is the highest in the RES Export case, driven by the GB side: Icelink reduces consumer costs related to CfD payments

- The socio-economic value is positive in the merchant cases in the Central and the High, and slightly negative in the Low

- The value of saved CO2 emissions in the Merchant cases is not accounted for

- GB transmission reinforcements costs are not included

Source: Pöyry
The socio-economic value of the Icelink project in the sensitivities is significantly lower than in the Central case.

- The overall welfare decreases significantly in the 800MW and 65% export sensitivities.

- The welfare decrease in GB, Iceland and for the interconnector itself.

- This does not take into account that grid reinforcement in GB may be cheaper under some of these sensitivities.

- This aspect may need to be analysed in more detail.

Source: Pöyry
The basis for the calculation of the IRR is different from the socio-economic analysis

- In the IRR calculation, the overall profitability of the relevant scope of Icelink is assessed.
- In the Full Merchant, only the interconnector is assessed.
- In the Integrated Merchant and RES Export cases, interconnection + new generation is assessed.
- Payments from Cap and Floor are taken into account in the calculation of profitability, with the assumption that the range 2.5-8.5% IRR is guaranteed by the mechanism.
- IRR is calculated as real, pre-tax value.

### Elements of cost/revenues in IRR calculation

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<td>Fixed opex</td>
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<td>New generation (Iceland)</td>
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<td>RES export and Integrated merchant</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Fixed Opex</td>
<td>RES export and Integrated merchant</td>
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<td>Revenues</td>
<td>Contract for Differences (strike price)</td>
<td>RES export case</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>or Wholesale revenues - price x export</td>
<td>Integrated merchant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Capacity payment revenues</td>
<td>Integrated merchant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cap and Floor</td>
<td>Integrated Merchant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>or Congestion rent</td>
<td>Full merchant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Capacity payment revenues</td>
<td>Full merchant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cap and Floor</td>
<td>Full merchant</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The commercial viability of the project is not guaranteed without integrating

- In the RES Export, the IRR is an input: the strike price is calculated to give a 7.9% IRR

- In the Full Merchant case the ‘straight’ IRR of 2.8% is increased to 3.7% with a cap and floor, by reducing the downside weather-related volatility

- In the Integrated Merchant, the rent generated by the cheapest new build in Iceland brings the entire project to a 5.8% IRR

- In the Low scenario, IRRs in the merchant cases are supported by the floor of the Cap and Floor mechanism
CONCLUSION

- The RES export case is a valid business case which can deliver a safe return for the Icelink project as a whole
  - A detailed commercial and regulatory analysis could be performed to find ideal setup for the project, starting from the Icelink Concept Document
  - A clear political support is required for this option, to support Icelink over a local offshore wind project

- The Full Merchant case has a positive socio-economically value, but a poor commercial return: it could get a cap and floor arrangement but would not find investors

- The Integrated Merchant case internalises the rents made by the cheapest of the new generation in Iceland, and reaches a rate of return closer to a commercial hurdle rate but still on the low side
  - A cap and floor would make the revenues less risky than standard generation investments
  - This option requires less political support, but is less attractive financially
7. Iceland Impact Analysis

Presentation for UK-ICE Task Energy Task Force

London, February 8th 2016
Economic impact analysis

Central scenario

- Indicates significant benefit
- 1.2-1.6% increase in GDP levels

- Short term impact during construction on:
  - Inflation
  - Unemployment
  - Interest rates

- Cumulative trade balance negative by 15% of GDP after the construction period
- 12-32% increase in electricity prices

- Determined by the long run marginal cost of electricity

- Higher electricity price as a result due to the utilisation of higher cost generation

- Price would still be substantially lower than in GB and North West Europe

**Impact on electricity prices**

*EUR 6-12 / MWh increase with IceLink*
Impact on households

Households use 5% of the electricity in Iceland

- 90% of the population has access to affordable geothermal heating
- 10% of the population uses electricity to heat their houses
Electricity prices in Iceland to households relatively low in comparison to other European countries.

- Comparison without network and taxes
- In Iceland the electricity price is 1/3 of the total electricity cost

Electricity price to European homes (EUR/MWh)

Without network cost and taxes (consumption 2,500-5,000 kWh/year)
Impact on households

Summary

- 0.85-1.7 ISK/MWh increase in electricity price (€0.6-1.2 EUR/MWh)

- Total impact on households
  - ISK 717-1,432 m.
  - EUR 5-10 m.

- Consumers without access to geothermal heating the most vulnerable group

- Potential mitigation
  - Lowering VAT
  - Support for energy efficiency
  - Increase subsidies for rural areas and vulnerable consumers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ISK millions</th>
<th>0.85 ISK/kWh</th>
<th>1.7 ISK/kWh</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>General consumption</td>
<td>486</td>
<td>971</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General use with heating</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>139</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Metered heating</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summerhouses</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>155</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>717</td>
<td>1,432</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Increase in households electricity cost due to Icelink
Current Long term Power purchase agreements provide some shelter for future price increase

Old PPA’s with average price around 20 EUR/MWh in 2014.

New PPA’s with price above 30 EUR/MWh

50-52 EUR/MWh is too high price for aluminium smelters in current environment

Impact on power intensive industries

Largest consumer group with 80% of current consumption

Service and other industries 16%

Households 5%

Power Intensive Industries 79%

Rio Tinto Alcan 18%

Alcoa Fjarðaál 27%

Elkem 6%

Norðurál 25%
Impact on power intensive industries

Iceland produced 1.5% of global primary aluminium production in 2014

- Power cost is substantial part of production cost of primary aluminium
- Lowest power cost in Canada and in the Middle east in 2014

1. CRU Aluminium Smelter Power Tariffs: Winners and losers
Impact on other industries and services

16% of current electricity use in Iceland

- Retail and service industry the largest group
- Utilities including producers own use is also large
- Agriculture and horticulture with only 1.2% of total demand

Power Intensive Industries (PII) 79%
Households 5%
Other Industries and services 16%

Public Service 2.0%
Retail and Service Industry 4.4%
Utilities 4.1%
Agriculture 1.2%
Seafood Industry 2.5%
Industry other than PII 1.4%
Impact on other industries and services

Electricity price to industry to industry in Europe (500-2,000 MWh/year)

- Comparison includes unrecoverable taxes, distribution and transmission charges
- Most other industries and services in Iceland are small and medium sized enterprises
- Electricity price to SME’s relatively low in Iceland compared to Europe
Impact on other industries and services

16% of the total electricity use in Iceland

- Total annual impact on other industries and services
  ISK 2,111-4,218 million

- EUR 15-30 million

- Most vulnerable users are
  - Agriculture & horticulture
  - Fishmeal factories
  - Bakeries

Annual impact of price increase due to Icelink

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ISK millions</th>
<th>0.85 ISK/kWh</th>
<th>1.7 ISK/kWh</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Retail &amp; service sector</td>
<td>657</td>
<td>1,312</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture &amp; horticulture</td>
<td>195</td>
<td>389</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public service</td>
<td>302</td>
<td>603</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seafood industry</td>
<td>377</td>
<td>754</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industries other than PII</td>
<td>266</td>
<td>533</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Utilities without power producers own use</td>
<td>314</td>
<td>627</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2,111</td>
<td>4,218</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
THE WATER VALUE CURVE

The opportunity cost of hydro power is given by fundamental power market models

- Hydro displaces production from thermal plants – the water in the hydro plant’s reservoir has an opportunity cost
  - This is the value of water storage
  - This is how water is actually bid into the market in the Nordics

- Water values depend on market conditions
  - system tightness,
  - Fuel/CO2 prices,
  - interconnections,
  - supply/demand balance

Illustrative water value curve

Source: Pöyry’s BID3 power market model
DETAILED P/C SURPLUS IN GB

CONFIDENTIAL
SECURITY OF SUPPLY WITH ICELINK

Icelink ensures ample supply is available, even with largest plant (Kárahnjúkar, 850MW) out for 6 weeks
Without Icelink, a large outage leads to rationing
EFFECT OF THE WEATHER

Hydrology is a critical driver of Icelink

- The weather is the main driver of variability in Iceland
- It leads to a 4TWh difference in annual inflow in Iceland, around 20% of annual demand
- Hydrology needs to be well represented in order to capture the fundamentals of Icelink
Detailed market modelling suggests that ‘flexibility’ (i.e., less than full export) comes in the form of reduced flow from Iceland to GB.

Even in the Low, limited number of hours with full export from GB to Iceland.

Duration curve of flows through Icelink

Source: Pöyry
In the Central scenario, a moderate amount of new capacity is expected to enter the market in the medium-term.
- CCGT, nuclear and renewables are the main new entrants in the long-term.
- In the Central scenario, we assume the 2020 NREAP renewable target will be met in 2030.

In the High scenario, relatively more new capacity is expected to enter the market to meet the increase in demand and to replace plants scheduled to close.
- We assume the 2020 NREAP renewable target will be met in 2020.

In the Low scenario, a moderate amount of new thermal capacity, mainly CCGTs and OCGTs, is expected to enter the market in the short to medium-term.
- We assume the 2020 NREAP renewable targets are never met in the timeframe to 2035.